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Group Understanding 
 
While social epistemologists have recently begun addressing questions about whether groups can 
possess beliefs or knowledge, little has yet been said about whether groups can properly be said 
to possess understanding. Here I want to make some progress on this question by considering 
two possible accounts of group understanding, modeled on accounts of group belief and 
knowledge: a deflationary account, according to which a group understands just in case most or 
all of its members understand, and an inflationary account, according to which a group’s 
understanding does not depend solely on whether its members understand. I argue that both 
accounts face problems. The deflationary account has two such problems: aggregation problems 
that are familiar from discussions of group belief, and the problem of different bases, wherein 
members possess understanding for different but consistent reasons. The inflationary account 
faces what I call the problem of distributed grasping: while it is widely accepted that 
understanding requires a kind of “grasping”, it is hard to make sense of how this requirement 
could be met at the group level while not necessarily being met by any individual member. 
Despite its problems, I make a case for the inflationary account. This will require addressing the 
problem of distributed grasping: to do this, I propose a different way of thinking about the 
grasping relation at the group level, such that it is constituted by a dependency relationship 
between members. 
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1. Groups as Epistemic Agents 
While epistemic and doxastic states like knowledge and belief have traditionally been taken to be 
the property of individual agents, social epistemologists have recently asked whether groups can 
possess such states, as well. The motivation for thinking that groups can possess beliefs and/or 
knowledge is threefold. First, attributing groups belief and knowledge can make sense of our 
linguistic practices of making belief and knowledge attributions: as many writing on group belief 
have noted, it seems perfectly natural to make belief ascriptions like “the committee believes that 
the proposal has merit”, “NASA believes that there will be up to 100 exoplanets discovered in 
the next year”, etc.; similarly, group knowledge ascriptions like “the committee knows which 
proposals have been accepted and which have been rejected”, “NASA knows that Pluto is no 
longer properly classified as a planet”, etc., seem just as natural. Second, conceiving of groups as 
believers and knowers makes sense of the way that we treat groups as sources of information: as 
exemplified by the above attributions, we will appeal to NASA if we want to know the latest 
information about exoplanets, will seek out information from a lab if we want to know about 
relevant scientific developments, etc. That groups can provide us with such knowledge is again 
at least prima facie reason for thinking that they possess it. 
Finally, attributing groups beliefs and knowledge can make sense of how groups behave. 
Consider a frequently cited case from Edward Hutchins (1995), which tells in detail the 
harrowing tale of the USS Palau, a ship which required all of its crew to work together to safely 
navigate it back to port after a serious malfunction. Hutchins draws the following conclusions 
from the case: 
The safe arrival of the Palau at anchor was due in large part to the exceptional 
seamanship of the bridge crew, especially the navigator. But no single individual on the 
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bridge acting alone - neither the captain nor the navigator nor the quartermaster chief 
supervising the navigation team - could have kept control of the ship and brought it safely 
to anchor. Many kinds of thinking were required to perform this task. Some of them were 
happening in parallel, some in coordination with others, some inside the heads of 
individuals, and some quite clearly both inside and outside the heads of the participants. 
(5-6) 
In Hutchins’ case, we have a successful action – the ship returning safely to port – that requires 
some specialized knowledge to perform. However, while the crew members individually 
possessed a lot of relevant beliefs and knowledge, no one member possessed all the relevant 
knowledge required to navigate the ship safely. That the action seems to have been performed by 
the crew as a group, then, again provides some motivation for thinking that it is the crew itself 
that possessed the relevant knowledge. In general, the lesson we can draw from Hutchins’ case is 
that since successful action often requires relevant knowledge on how to complete that action, 
that a group can perform complex actions successfully gives us reason to believe that the group 
itself possesses the relevant knowledge. 
None of these reasons are enough to definitively establish that groups do, without a 
doubt, possess beliefs and knowledge: instead, the motivation for investigating group epistemic 
states is one based on the seemingly best or simplest explanation. That being said, my aim here is 
to extend the investigation of group doxastic and epistemic states to include understanding. 
Again, the goal here is not to provide a definitive proof that groups possess understanding, but 
instead to motivate the investigation by appeal to the simplest or best explanation, and then to 
argue for a view that could account for a group’s possessing understanding. To do this, I will 
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first survey the different positions that have been taken on group belief and knowledge to act as a 
template for the discussion of group understanding.  
There are two possible answers to the question of whether groups have beliefs: either 
they have them, or they don’t1. Call the latter view: 
Group Belief Nihilism (GBN): Groups cannot be said to have beliefs in a 
nonmetaphorical way. 
Note that one can be a proponent of GBN and still accept that we do, in fact, use language in 
such a way that ascribes beliefs to groups, treat groups as sources of information, and conceive 
of groups as capable of performing actions: one just has to deny that such ascriptions are 
anything more than loose talk, and to develop alternative accounts of group testimony and action. 
Of those who argue that groups can be believers, though, there are two main views: 
Deflationary Group Belief (DGB): A group G believes that p just in case all or the 
majority of its members believe that p. 
Inflationary Group Belief (IGB): Whether a group G believes that p does not depend 
solely on whether its members believe that p.2 
 
1 References to those working on group belief will show up in various places in what follows, but 
some of the most prominent work on the topic includes Gilbert (1987), Tuomela (1992), Pettit 
(2003), Hakli (2006), List and Pettit (2011), Bird (2014), Goldman (2014), Lackey (2016), and 
Dunn (forthcoming), amongst others. Similarly, references to those arguing for group knowledge 
will show up in what follows, but again one can look to Goldman (2004), Tuomela (2004), 
Mathieson (2006), Hakli (2007), Lackey (2014), amongst others. 
2 The distinction between the deflationary and inflationary views as I present them here are 
intentionally course-grained in order to avoid delving too much into the debates surrounding the 
metaphysics of groups. There are potentially many different ways to be either a deflationist or 
inflationist according to the definitions I provide, but I take the three categories I present here – 
nihilism, deflationary accounts, and inflationary accounts – to exhaust the logical space at a 
broad level. 
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Similar positions can be taken when it comes to group knowledge. First, one might deny that 
groups can be properly said to know, in which case one would defend: 
Group Knowledge Nihilism (GKN): Groups cannot be said to have knowledge in a 
nonmetaphorical way. 
Similarly, of those who argue that groups can, in fact, be knowers, there are two main options: 
Deflationary Group Knowledge (DGK): A group G knows that p just in case all or the 
majority of its members know that p. 
Inflationary Group Knowledge (IGK): Whether a group G know that p does not 
depend solely on whether its members know that p. 
In general, for the deflationist any attribution of group belief or knowledge that p indicates 
nothing more than its members believe or know that p, whereas for the inflationist one cannot 
infer from an attribution of group belief or knowledge that p to any member belief or knowledge 
that p. 
The central challenge facing any theory that defends the existence of group belief or 
knowledge is to figure out how a group’s state is related to the relevant states of its members. 
Both the deflationary and inflationary approaches face their own version of the challenge. First, 
deflationary accounts generally employ a kind of aggregation procedure to determine the state of 
the group. There are, however, concerns about the right way to aggregate member states, and 
worries that there are potentially multiple rational aggregation procedures that could be applied 
to members of a group that will in turn provide different outcomes with regards to the state of the 
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group3. Inflationary accounts avoid this problem in that they do not need to employ any specific 
aggregation procedure in determining group belief. However, a tension in such accounts is that 
while they allow there to be a difference between group and member states, it remains the case 
that group states cannot float completely free from those of its members. For example, one 
prominent inflationary account claims that for a group to believe that p does not require that any 
of its members believe that p, but that all or most of its members jointly accept that p, and that 
group belief consists in this joint acceptance (Gilbert, 1994). While it is not clear whether this 
view succeeds4, it illustrates the problem that while a group can be in a state that few or none of 
its members are in, that state cannot come from nowhere: there has to be some relationship 
between group and members states, and the challenge is in figuring out what that relationship is5. 
 
3 See, for example, Gilbert (1994), List and Pettit (2002), Pettit (2003), and List (2005), amongst 
others. 
4 Others have argued that joint acceptance cannot constitute group belief since it does not have 
the hallmarks of belief (i.e. it is not necessarily truth-directed, and it is voluntary), and so group 
belief must be established in some other way. See for example Meijers (2003) and Mathieson 
(2006). 
5 While the general views one can defend with regards to either group belief or knowledge are 
the same, questions concerning the nature of group knowledge can be more complicated 
depending on how we think about what it takes to know. One could, for example, hold a 
deflationary conception of group belief while also holding an inflationary conception of group 
justification. Indeed, a number of inflationary conceptions of group justification have recently 
been proposed (see for example Schmitt (1994), Hakli (2011), Goldman (2014), Lackey (2016), 
Dunn (forthcoming)), along with various inflationary conceptions of related group epistemic 
states that can allow for a group to meet the required conditions for being a knower, for example 
that groups can meet the conditions of being a good informant (see Lackey (2016)) or the 
requirements of being a rational agent (Mathiesen, 2006)). Other approaches to group knowledge 
are also available: one could also simply reject the view that knowledge is analyzable into 
component parts (in the vein of Williamson (2001)), and thus not need to account for the ways in 
which a group could meet the above conditions. Or, one could argue that knowledge does not 
work in the same way at the group level as it does at the individual level: for instance, while it is 
popular to accept the view that knowledge entails belief, Raul Hakli (2007) has argued that this 
entailment does not hold at the group level, with groups being able to possess knowledge despite 
not being able to possess beliefs. I introduce these complications here not to adjudicate among 
them, but to draw attention to potential complications. 
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My primary interest here is not directly with determining the right way to think about 
group belief and/or knowledge, but rather to extend the framework of the discussion of these 
states to include understanding. Doing so faces immediate complications. First, unlike belief and 
knowledge, understanding has not received nearly as much attention from epistemologists, and 
thus many fundamental questions about the nature of understanding remain open, even at the 
level of the individual. Second, we have not yet seen any motivation for addressing the question 
of whether groups can, in fact, understand. In order to even get started on considering the space 
of possible positions one could take towards group understanding and the pros and cons thereof, 
then, we need to first get a sense of what understanding is, and why we should care about it at the 
group level. 
 
2. Understanding 
Any discussion of understanding has to start with the disclaimer that it is an area of 
significant debate as to what it takes, exactly, to understand. While there is no consensus as to 
what a fully-fledged theory of understanding consists in6, there has at least been some agreement 
as to what the main questions are, and even some agreement on necessary requirements. One 
central question concerns the different forms of understanding, and whether one should be 
considered more fundamental than the others. For example, one can talk about understanding-
why something is the case7, understanding-how to do something8, understanding-that something 
 
6 A couple of the most fully fleshed-out recent conceptions can be found in Khalifa (2017) and 
de Regt (2017). 
7 See de Regt and Dieks (2005), Pritchard, Millar, and Haddock (2010), Hills (2015), Khalifa 
(2013), and Wilkenfeld et al. (2016), for example. 
8 See Zagzebski (2008). 
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is the case9, or understanding some object or phenomenon10, and it is up for debate how these 
various forms relate to one another. A second major question concerns whether understanding is 
reducible to knowledge (the reductionist view), or whether it constitutes a sui generis epistemic 
state (the nonreductionist view)11. In what follows I will remain agnostic with regards to the 
reductionism/non-reductionism debate, as I do not think anything important hangs on it here. I do 
need to say something, however, about the relevant forms of understanding I will address here. 
 While there is not enough space in a single paper to be able to address all the intricacies 
of each possible form of understanding, I do want to make two main distinctions that will narrow 
the discussion that follows at least a bit. First, we can make a distinction between forms of 
understanding that are propositional and those that are non-propositional. Propositional forms of 
understanding take a proposition as their object: understanding-why p, understanding-that p, and 
understanding-how p will, for my purposes, fall under the category of propositional 
understanding12, whereas understanding an object or phenomenon will not13. Here I will be 
concerned with propositional understanding, as to better draw comparisons to discussions of 
group belief and knowledge. Second, I will not here have anything to say about so-called tacit or 
innate forms of understanding – for example, types of understanding that children might be said 
 
9 See Bourget (2017). 
10 See Kvanvig (2003), Wilkenfeld (2013), and Kelp (2015). 
11 See Grimm (2006) for discussion. 
12 We might think that understanding-how doesn’t belong on this list, as it might appear to 
involve skills and abilities that are not obviously propositional. While that may be the case, I still 
take it that ascriptions of understanding-how still apply to propositions. 
13 Again, we might worry about the distinction here, as we might think that even though 
understanding an object or phenomenon does not take a proposition as an object, the state of 
understanding such an object or phenomenon is still represented in a propositional way (see Kelp 
(2015), for example). Since it is, however, an open question as to how such a form of 
understanding is represented, I will separate it from the others here. 
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to possess when it comes to language development14. While there are many interesting things to 
be said about these types of understanding, I exclude these forms of understanding again for the 
sake of streamlining discussion. 
With that being said, we can now get a general sense of the component parts necessary 
for understanding. Again, while there is no complete consensus on what these parts consist in, 
we can at least sketch the following minimal conception: 
Minimal Conception of Understanding 
For S to understand (why/how/that) p requires: 
Representation: S possesses a representation of p and reasons that support it; 
Getting It Right: p is true, or S’s representation of p accurately mirrors reality; 
Grasping: S grasps the relationship between p and the relevant reasons that support it. 
There are a number of things to say about this minimal conception overall, as well as its 
individual components. Overall: first, I take these conditions to be necessary, but not necessarily 
sufficient, for the possession of propositional understanding. Second, this conception is neutral 
on the reductionism/nonreductionism question, since we can cash out the relevant conditions in 
either reductionist- or nonreductionist-friendly ways (for example, if one is a reductionist, then 
one could argue that the kind of representation that is involved in understanding is just believing, 
and that to grasp something is just to possess a certain set of knowledge; if one is a 
nonreductionist, then one could argue, for example, that grasping requires something more or 
 
14 See, for example, Chomsky (1965), Bruner (1974), and Johnson (2007) for discussions of tacit 
understanding in language development from several different perspectives. 
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different than a mere collection of beliefs or knowledge). Finally, such a conception permits of 
degrees of understanding. For instance, one might possess “stronger” or “deeper” understanding 
depending on the amount of reasons that one possesses in support of a given proposition or the 
connections between reasons that one represents. I take this to represent an intuitive 
characteristic of understanding, namely that one can understand something better than something 
or someone else. 
So far, so non-committal. Let us now consider each of these conditions in turn. The first 
condition – representation – is the general requirement that to possess understanding a subject 
must, in some way, represent the relevant content of that which is understood. This 
representation could, for example, take the form of belief – such that one believes p, reasons for 
p, and the relationship between p and reasons for it – or some other form15. Second is getting it 
right. It is not entirely straightforward how we should interpret this requirement. We might say 
that, at least when the relevant kind of understanding takes a proposition as an object – say in 
cases in which understands-that p – one gets it right when the relevant proposition is true. 
However, since understanding involves representing more than one proposition, we might think 
that getting it right requires more than the truth of a single proposition. Stephen Grimm (2012), 
for instance, helpfully discusses the concept of a representation “mirroring” reality: for example, 
Grimm argues that understanding mirrors reality in a way that is different from believing or 
assenting to a proposition, in that it takes on the “nomological structure of the world, in the sense 
that the grasped structure will inform the mind in a way that it failed to do before, when one 
merely assented to the proposition” (110). Consider, for example, understanding-why a glass that 
fell off a table shattered when it hit the tile floor: in this case one mentally represents the 
 
15 For more detailed discussion, see Kelp (2015). 
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relationship between the glass, the floor, the tendency of glass to shatter when dropped from 
certain height, etc. One thus gets it right in the sense that one possesses a mental representation 
of a structure that is, in fact, reflective of reality16. 
The final and perhaps most controversial component of understanding is the grasping 
requirement. While there is again no consensus as to what it means to grasp something in the 
epistemic sense, a few different views have recently gained popularity. For example, according 
to an abilities account of grasping, grasping requires being able to do certain things with one’s 
representation of p and reasons why p. Allison Hills (2015), for example, argues that in grasping 
one has cognitive control over p and propositions related to it. On Hills’ account, this cognitive 
control involves one being able to do some or all of the following: 
(i) follow some explanation of why p given by someone else. 
(ii) explain why p in your own words. 
(iii) draw the conclusion that p (or that probably p) from the information that q. 
(iv) draw the conclusion that p’ (or that probably p’) from the information that q’ 
(where p’ and q’ are similar to but not identical to p and q). 
(v) given the information that p, give the right explanation, q. 
(vi) given the information that p’, give the right explanation, q’. (3) 
One ability that has been considered particularly important is the ability to provide relevant 
explanations in the right kinds of circumstances: Khalifa (2013), for example, argues that 
 
16 That understanding requires truth, in one form or another, is the dominant view; that is not to 
say that it is the only view (see, for example, Zagzebski (2008)). Here I will assume that one 
cannot understanding something that is false. 
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grasping “involves reliable explanatory evaluation”, such that one possesses true beliefs of the 
form ‘q entails p’ and is able to evaluate and discriminate between different explanation for p17.  
While there are thus many open debates about the nature of understanding and its various 
components, few have discussed understanding as being possessed by anything other than an 
individual. As we will see in what follows, considering understanding as something that can be 
possessed by groups will complicate these discussions in various ways. Before getting there, 
however, I need to first motivate the view that groups can, in fact, possess understanding. As was 
the case for group belief and knowledge, this motivation will be threefold: first, just as we 
commonly and naturally ascribe belief and knowledge to groups, we also commonly and 
naturally make group understanding ascriptions; second, in the same way that attributing a 
group belief and knowledge was often the best way to explain group behavior, there will also be 
cases in which attributing a group understanding will be the best way to explain group behavior; 
finally, just as our appealing to groups as a source of knowledge is reason to attribute that 
knowledge to those groups, that we appeal to groups as a source of understanding is reason to 
think that said groups do, in fact, possess the relevant understanding. I consider these reasons in 
turn. 
 
 
 
 
 
17 For additional conceptions of grasping one can look to Kvanvig (2003), Grimm (2006), 
Wilkenfeld (2013), amongst others. 
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3.  Motivating Group Understanding 
The first reason for thinking that groups can possess understanding comes from our 
commonplace ascriptions of understanding. Consider some examples of group understanding 
attributions from the world of business and advertising18: 
“The- Ray-Ban lab understands the design inside and out, which allows them to create 
the perfect shape for the sunglasses.” 
“Atlanta Residential Property group understands your needs and wishes, are courteous, 
kind and a perfect company for the job.” 
“Our team understands that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ in financial planning. That's why 
we take the time to listen to your concerns and goals before we crunch a single number.” 
Given that these kinds of attributions are made with the purpose of selling a product, one might 
be tempted to analyze them as little more than loose talk. However, it is similarly common to 
find attributions of understanding in more demanding contexts: for example, when it comes to 
laboratory groups, working groups, think tanks, and the like. Consider the following group 
understanding attribution: 
Roberta Diaz Brinton, a neuroscientist at the University of Arizona in Tucson, says it is 
clear that the NIH working group understands how the culture of science enables 
harassment. Science “can be the Wild West sometimes”, she says, and its standards of 
professional conduct lag behind those of other fields. (Reardon, 2019) 
 
18 All of these examples were taken from the iWeb corpus (https://www.english-
corpora.org/iweb/). 
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It seems that while we would apply higher standards to a National Institute of Health working 
group than to, say, Ray Ban, both attributions are natural and seemingly felicitous. 
In addition to natural language attributions of understanding to groups, we can also 
readily find discussions of group understanding in the world of science communication, where a 
goal is to gauge and ultimately improve the level of understanding of scientific issues at the 
community level. For example, questions can be asked about the extent to which a community 
understands issues of contemporary importance – for instance, concerning the existence of 
anthropogenic climate change and the safety of vaccines – and how best to increase that 
understanding. Finally, discussions of scientific understanding are directed not only at laypeople, 
but at scientists themselves. One debate in the philosophy of science concerns whether 
understanding should properly be considered a goal of scientific inquiry, and if so, how we 
should conceive of this goal. Hank de Regt (2019), for example, defends the view that science 
aims to produce understanding at three different levels: that of the individual, that of a 
community of scientists, and that of the scientific enterprise as a whole (90). Similarly, Paul 
Humphreys (2000) distinguishes between primary and secondary understanding – the first of 
which arises from a process of discovery, the latter arising from a process of instruction – and 
argues that such forms of understanding can exist at either the individual or group level. While I 
will not defend either of these views, group understanding attributions from the philosophy of 
science can again motivate us to investigate the nature of understanding at the group level.  
One could, however, argue that all of the above evidence is perfectly compatible with a 
view in which group understanding attributions are merely metaphorical – perhaps they are a 
shorthand for discussions of the understanding of individuals within a group. In other words, one 
could accept everything that I have said thus far and still adhere to: 
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Group Understanding Nihilism (GUN): Groups cannot be said to have understanding 
in a nonmetaphorical way. 
The GUN defender will, of course, have to provide some other explanation of how the above 
attributions are felicitous. There are two additional reasons, however, to think that GUN is not 
the best available view. 
The second motivation mentioned above was that positing group understanding is often 
the best way to explain a group’s actions. I will not here defend a robust theory of group action. 
Instead, I will look at some observations of what we might naturally describe as group action, 
and consider what the best explanations of those observations could be. Again, consider 
Hutchins’ USS Palau example as a motivation for considering the existence of inflationary group 
knowledge, namely that successful group action is best explained by the group’s possession of 
knowledge. What about the case of understanding? What we need to show is that there are 
actions that are ostensibly performed by a group that can be best explained by that group 
possessing understanding. Consider first some of the abilities that Hills outlines above that are 
arguably necessary for, or at least characteristic of, understanding, namely being able to provide 
explanations and draw conclusions from information and other information closely related to it. 
It is not required, of course, that understanding entails being able to provide all possible 
explanations of a given explanandum, or being able to draw all relevant conclusions from all 
related information: as understanding is something that comes in degrees, having more extensive 
abilities will be characteristic of having deeper understanding. That being said, offering 
explanations and drawing conclusions does seem to be something that groups do: a laboratory, 
for example, can not only report that a certain drug is an effective treatment for such-and-such 
ailment, but explain why it is, while think tanks can draw conclusions from information, and 
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when presented with related information, can apply their abilities to draw conclusions from it. 
Indeed, being able to do these things often seems like the point of forming such groups in the 
first place: since some problems exhibit complexity beyond the abilities of an individual, a group 
is required in order to explain them, and some groups are seemingly much better at being able to 
apply information to come up with new solutions to related problems than any individual could. 
That a group can not only solve complex problems, but explain the solution and apply it to 
related problems, suggests that such a group bears the hallmarks of the possession of 
understanding. 
Finally, and relatedly, a reason for attributing understanding to groups is that we often 
treat groups as sources of understanding. For example, consider advice that we might give to 
someone looking to acquire some new understanding – “if you really want to understand how to 
make a good macaron then you should talk to that group of bakers” – or explanations we might 
give for how we came to acquire understanding –  “I didn’t understand why some people grow 
unsightly ear hair before I consulted the ear-hair lab”, etc. 19 Furthermore, it seems that we often 
treat groups as experts, or possessors of expertise. Consider again some of the above 
understanding ascriptions: we might think that the prize committee is qualified to make prize 
decisions because the group possesses expertise in the relevant field, or that the NIH working 
group is best qualified to make recommendations concerning the climate of women in science 
given its expertise. That we will sometimes treat groups as the best source of information and as 
possessing expertise is again reason to think that said groups possess understanding. For 
 
19 While I think we do seek out groups as sources of understanding, it is not as clear-cut how to 
conceive of a group as a source of understanding, at least in comparison to a group being a 
source of knowledge. This is because it is a matter of debate as to whether understanding (and 
not just the basis for understanding) can be acquired on the basis of testimony. For more on this 
debate, see Boyd (2017). 
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instance, Wilkenfeld et al. (2016) argue that a functional role of understanding attributions is the 
identification of experts: the authors conducted empirical studies of folk attributions of 
understanding, concluding that such attributions vary according to the extent to which folk 
ascribe explanatory information to the object of attribution, as well as the degree to which they 
are willing to defer to said object as an expert. Since, as the above examples illustrate, it seems 
clear that we do treat some groups as possessing a significant depth of explanatory information 
and, as a result, defer to them in the ways that Wilkenfeld et al. argue accompanies 
understanding attributions at the level of the individual, it stands to reason that attributions of 
group understanding would similarly follow suit. 
Again, the reasons I have presented thus far do not by themselves constitute a definitive 
proof that groups do, in fact, possess understanding. However, attributing understanding to 
groups makes sense of the various linguistic data, relevant group actions, and the ways in which 
we rely on those groups as sources of information. Additionally, we might consider that if it were 
an individual about whom we made natural language attributions of understanding, who was able 
to solve relevant problems and apply information, and who we treated as an expert, that we 
would likely not hesitate to ascribe them understanding. That it is a group that exhibits 
characteristics of understanding should thus motivate us to examine the possibility of group 
understanding further. 
Now that we are sufficiently motivated, we can develop two possible theories of group 
understanding that parallel those of group knowledge and belief: 
Deflationary Group Understanding (DGU): A group G understands (why, how, that) p 
just in case all or the majority of its members understands (why, how, that) p. 
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Inflationary Group Understanding (IGU): Whether a group G understands (why, how, 
that) p does not depend solely on whether its members understand (why, how, that) p. 
Right away there are two things that to be said about these formulations. First, since 
understanding comes in potentially many forms, there are potentially many different versions of 
DGU and IGU. I will be speaking generally about propositional understanding encompassing all 
of these three forms, as I again do not think that anything important hangs on the difference 
between the forms at this point. The second is that, depending on how we conceive of the general 
nature of understanding, DGU and IGU may be reducible to their respective parallel questions 
about group knowledge. Again, if we accept the reductionist view then DGU is simply a specific 
instance of DGK, and IGU is simply a specific instance of IGK. Without delving into the 
reductionist question, we can conduct an initial survey of DGU and IGU for plausibility. I will 
argue that each view faces its own significant problems: first, the deflationary account faces both 
aggregation problems and what I will call the different bases problem; second, the inflationary 
account faces what I will call the distributed grasping problem. Let’s start with DGU. 
 
4. Deflationary Group Understanding 
In determining how we should think of a deflationary conception of group understanding we can 
again look to other deflationary conceptions of group doxastic and epistemic states. For example, 
according to a deflationary account of group belief, to determine group belief we look at what 
members of the group believes, and then apply some relevant aggregation procedure. DGU, then, 
would presumably also work by looking to member states and applying an aggregation 
procedure of its own. 
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There are, however, different member states that we could aggregate when determining 
group understanding according to DGU. First, we could aggregate individual member 
understanding. According to this approach, we look to each member to see if they possess some 
relevant understanding, and if there are enough members that possess that understanding then the 
group is taken to possess the relevant understanding, as well. One worry with this approach is 
that it results in a potentially uninteresting conception of group understanding, in that we are 
perhaps doing little more than stipulating that a group possesses understanding once its members 
have reached a relevant critical mass. Indeed, it is not clear why we should prefer a view like 
DGU over GUN if we are determining group understanding in this purely summative way. 
There is, however, perhaps a more pressing problem, which is that we can generate cases 
in which all of the members of a group possess understanding but in which it the group itself 
does not. Consider the following toy case of a group with two members: 
Disagreeing Historians: Two historian colleagues, Celine and Tamika, both specialize in 
Roman history. However, they disagree about many causes of events in the history of the 
Roman empire, specifically its demise: while Celine believes that invading barbarian 
tribes was the primary cause, Tamika believes it was widespread government corruption. 
While these sets of reasons do not conflict with one another, Celine and Tamika disagree 
about which explanation is correct. As it turns out, they are, to an extent, both right: the 
fall of Rome was overdetermined, and thus while each cause by itself would have been 
enough to topple the empire, the full account involves multiple causes. 
Here is what I think we should conclude from the case: while both Celine and Tamika possess a 
degree of understanding as to why Rome fell, the group consisting of both Celine and Tamika 
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does not possess that understanding. This result conflicts with a summative view that dictates 
that since all members possess a degree of understanding, so, too, does the group. 
These claims need some more support. First, note that both Celine and Tamika can 
possess a degree of understanding and disagree with one another while both meet the getting it 
right requirement: since they are disagreeing about an event that is overdetermined, they can 
both represent reasons and relations that accurately reflect reality, even though neither reflects 
reality in its entirety. Second, the fact that they disagree with one another should not deny either 
of them their degree of understanding: it seems completely acceptable, for instance, that I should 
be able to understand something to a certain degree even though others disagree with me about 
it20. Finally, note that the case attributes a degree of understanding, but not, say, a complete 
understanding to the group members. This is again because neither member accepts all the 
relevant reasons why Rome fell. However, that understanding can come in degrees allows for the 
possibility of having a degree of understanding while not possessing every relevant reason. 
Why, then, should we think that the group does not possess some degree of 
understanding, as well? Here we can again appeal to our characteristic indications of 
understanding, and to note that the group consisting of Celine and Tamika does not possess those 
 
20 One might worry that the situation is actually worse for Celine and Tamika, in that we should 
not ascribe them even a degree of understanding: this is because they seem to be wrong about the 
fall of Rome, insofar as they misrepresent the event as one in which there was, in fact, a primary 
cause. To deny them any degree of understanding on this basis, though, would again set the 
standards for the possession of understanding too high: just as one can possess a degree of 
understanding without possessing all possible supporting reasons, it seems that one can possess a 
degree of understanding despite being wrong about some relevant reasons. For example, we still 
want to say that novices who start learning about a subject matter can increase their degree of 
understanding in it despite possessing some false beliefs along the way (I make this as a general 
observation, and will not here defend a specific view concerning how much one can get wrong 
before losing all of one’s understanding). Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pushing this 
worry. 
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characteristics. This is because the historians are, from their point of view, conflicted: although 
they agree that Rome did, in fact, fall, they cannot agree on which reasons support that answer. 
As a result, the group is unable to provide a consistent explanation (as its members do not agree 
what such an explanation should be), is unable to draw relevant conclusions from related 
information (as its members do not agree on what lessons one can draw from the fall of Rome), 
and is unable to act as a good source of information (as seeking out information from such a 
group would likely just result in confusion about what the right answer is). Note that, of course, 
each member individually possesses these abilities – both Celine and Tamika on their own can 
give consistent (although incomplete) explanations, can draw relevant conclusions from related 
information (although not all such conclusions), and can act as good sources of information. That 
they can do so individually, however, is simply indicative of their individually possessing a 
degree of understanding.  
Call the problem exemplified by Disagreeing Historians the different bases problem: 
although all or most members of a group may possess some relevant degree of understanding, 
when their understanding is based on different reasons that not all members accept, the group 
itself may not possess any degree of understanding. It does not seem, then, that a simple 
aggregation of member understanding is sufficient to determine group understanding. Instead, 
we need to look more closely at the reasons that members of a group possess. 
What else should we be aggregating when determining whether a group possesses 
understanding according to DGU? We have seen that understanding requires more than belief in 
an individual proposition, so in determining, say, whether a group understands-why p, it will not 
be enough to simply determine whether a group believes that p. We could, however, make some 
strides towards a deflationary conception of understanding by looking not just at whether a 
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group’s members believe that p, but also if they believe or otherwise represent reasons for p and 
the relationship between p and those reasons. Here, then, is one way we could develop DGU: we 
could say that since in order for a group to understand (why/how/that) p minimally requires that 
the group believes p and reasons for p, we could look to members of a group to see if all of these 
beliefs are represented at the group level. 
Trying to determine whether groups meet these conditions on the basis of an aggregate of 
member beliefs, however, faces a familiar problem found in literature on summative models of 
group belief. Consider another toy example: say that to understand (why/how/that) p minimally 
requires that one possess the set of beliefs p, reasons q and r for p, and the relevant beliefs that p 
because of those reasons (i.e. the belief that p because q and r). The problem in determining 
whether a group meets all these conditions on the basis on a summative model of member beliefs 
comes about when the members hold different sets of beliefs. Consider the following set of 
beliefs for members A, B, and C, of some group: 
 P Q R P because Q P because R P because Q and R 
Member A Yes Yes No Yes No No 
Member B Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Member C Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
This set of member beliefs faces a version of Pettit’s (2005) “doctrinal paradox” for aggregative 
views of group belief: according to Pettit, there are multiple procedures one could use to 
aggregate member beliefs, and thus come to different conclusions about what that group 
believes. Our problem is to determine whether we should think that a group consisting of 
members in the states represented by the above table does, in fact, meet the minimal 
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requirements for understanding. However, if we consider whether each individual member meets 
the condition of believing P because Q and R , then we will get the result that since the majority 
of the members of the group do not meet this condition, then neither does the group (this 
aggregation procedure is akin to Pettit’s “conclusion-centred” approach). If, however, we 
consider the group’s position toward each individual belief, then since the majority of the 
group’s members all believe P, Q, R, P because Q, and P because R, then so too should we 
consider the group to believe all of these as well, and thus that the group also believes that P 
because Q and R (this aggregation procedure is akin to Pettit’s “premise-centred” approach). 
The version of the doctrinal problem for determining conditions for group understanding 
is that we are stuck with the choice of using one of two aggregation procedures that gives equally 
plausible but conflicting results. In the toy example above, the problem stems from a situation in 
which understanding is determined by possession of a number of reasons, but for which only a 
minority of members believe all of those relevant reasons. This is not to say that the problem is 
insurmountable – perhaps there is reason to prefer one type of aggregation procedure over 
another – but it is at the very least a problem that the DGU proponent needs to address. 
I have argued thus far that there are two problems in aggregating member states in 
determining group understanding, one that is familiar from aggregation problems for beliefs, and 
one that is more specific to understanding. We could avoid these problems if we accepted an 
inflationary account of group understanding, instead. However, inflationary views face their 
share of problems, as well. 
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5. Inflationary Group Understanding 
As mentioned earlier, the primary challenge in defending any inflationary conception of group 
doxastic or epistemic states is to determine how the state of the group is related to the relevant 
states of its members given that the group does not necessarily share any state with its members. 
It is clear that the epistemic state of a group cannot be completely divorced from the states of its 
members – it is implausible, for example, that a group could know that p while none of its 
members had any relationship with p or propositions related to p21. The problem is thus in 
determining what relationship members do need to have towards a proposition or set of 
propositions in order to produce a different relationship at the group level. When it comes to 
IGU, our question becomes: what exactly, do members of a group need to possess in order for 
the group to understand? 
We can again turn to conceptions of other group epistemic and doxastic states for 
guidance. For instance, as we saw above one inflationary conception of group belief that has 
received considerable attention is Margaret Gilbert’s (1996) view that group belief consists in 
joint commitment. According to Gilbert: 
(i) A group G believes that p if and only if the members of G jointly accept that p. (ii) A 
group jointly accepts that p if and only if it is common knowledge in G that the individual 
members of G have openly expressed a conditional commitment jointly to accept that p 
together with other members of G. (204-05) 
 
21 Alexander Bird (2010) defends a view that perhaps has the most significant disconnect 
between group and member states, as he argues that there can exist “socially distributed” 
knowledge wherein the scientific community as a whole can possess knowledge in such a way 
that the relevant members neither know nor believe what the entity knows.  
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Such a view can account for how a group can possess a belief that p despite none of its members 
believing that p, while still maintaining a relationship between the state of the group and the 
states of its members. Of course, understanding has more moving parts than belief, and so an 
inflationary conception of group understanding will potentially have to take into account more 
than one relationship between the group and its members. Perhaps the most significant hurdle in 
developing an inflationary conception of group understanding involves the grasping component. 
While we do not have a definitive conception of grasping at the level of the individual, it is even 
less clear as to what it would mean to say that a “group grasps”. We also saw that, at the very 
least, grasping does not involve a relationship with a single proposition, but instead a proposition 
as it relates to reasons that support it, as well as relevant abilities to do things with the 
information represented. In developing an inflationary conception of group understanding, then, 
we need to determine what it would mean for a group to grasp, and how that grasping can be 
produced by its members. 
To help develop these ideas, it will be illustrative to apply a metaphor common from 
discussions of individual understanding. Conceptions of epistemic grasping are sometimes 
modeled off of conceptions of physical grasping: just as it is the case that to have a physical 
grasp of some object is to be able to manipulate it in certain ways, so, too, is it the case that to 
have an epistemic grasp is to be able to manipulate the relevant information in certain ways (for 
example, in the ways the Hills (2015) describes above). We can, then, similarly appeal to cases 
of physical group grasping to help model epistemic group grasping. Consider, for example, a 
case in which a man has fallen into a river, with a strong current threatening to carry him 
downstream and out of reach of help. Thinking quickly, a friend on the shore tosses him a rope, 
which the man in the river is able to hold onto. With the current being so strong, however, the 
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friend on the shore has to call on three others for help, all of whom grab part of the rope. 
Individually, none of them would be able to maintain a grip on the rope, or manipulate it in the 
desired way (i.e. to rescue the drowning friend). Together, however, they are able to pull the man 
to shore. 
That the group of friends is able to grasp the rope while no individual is able to on their 
own shows that group grasping, at least when it comes to physical grasping, is not some exotic 
notion. Of course, what is more important is what lessons we can draw from the physical concept 
in developing the epistemic one. In the physical case, the group’s grasping of the rope is 
exemplified by certain abilities to do something with it, namely to pull their friend to shore, and 
to make small adjustments if needed, say if there are any obstacles in the river they need to get 
around. As was the case for individual grasping, we might then think that epistemic grasping at 
the group level similarly requires the group to be able to manipulate the relevant information in 
certain ways; again, perhaps by being able to produce explanations of the relevant information 
and information related to it. 
While the discussion so far is incomplete, it at least shows that epistemic grasping at the 
group level makes conceptual sense. We are, of course, still left with the question of how this 
grasping actually comes about at the group level when it may not be possessed by any individual 
member. In this regard we can again model a notion of epistemic group grasping on one of 
physical group grasping: just as in the physical case grasping requires that each member rely on 
the work of the other to produce the intended outcome, we can say that so too in the epistemic 
case does group grasping require a kind of reliance that is directed towards a common goal. 
Here, then, is a way we can conceive of epistemic grasping at the group level: 
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Group Grasping: A group G grasps p and its relationship to reasons that support p just 
in case (i) G represents p and reasons for p, and (ii) the members of G are mutually p-
reliant. 
Part (i) of this equation captures the requirement that the necessary material to be grasped is 
represented somewhere within the group, although I leave it open as to how, exactly, the relevant 
material is represented (one could, for instance, appeal to a theory of group belief)22. More 
important is (ii), and the notion of “mutual p-reliance”. To illustrate what I have in mind, 
consider again the way in which individuals rely on one another in the case of physical group 
grasping: they rely on each other insofar as they are aware both that they must direct effort 
towards the same goal, and that if any other let go then they would not be able to pull their friend 
to shore safely on their own. In the epistemic case the situation is analogous: if the goal of the 
group is to understand (why/how/that) p, then members of the group are mutually p-reliant in the 
case that they recognize both that they are contributing towards the relevant goal (perhaps in the 
form of representing reasons and relationships between reasons), and that they would not be able 
to achieve that goal on their own (given the circumstances). To illustrate, consider the following 
cases, one in which a group contains members that are mutually p-reliant, and another that does 
not: 
Dependable Autobody: The local autobody shop is known for its efficiency and 
camaraderie amongst the workers. The shop consists of a series of specialists: one who 
works on engines, another on brakes, another on wheels and alignment, etc. Cars going 
 
22 There is much that could be said about what it takes for a group to represent p and reasons for 
it. The current formulation is, however, intentionally schematic, and is neutral on which theory 
of group representation is the right one. 
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into the shop go through a certain process: first, the onboard computer is checked for 
errors; next, it is sent to the specialist on wheels and alignment to check from problems; 
after that, it goes to the specialist on brakes; and so forth, until every part of the car has 
been inspected. While each specialist is focused on their part of the job, they nevertheless 
trust that the other has done what they need to do when looking for problems in their part 
of the car. In general, the group works well as a team, and the significant majority of cars 
that come into the shop go out fixed in a short amount of time. 
Dysfunctional Autobody: The autobody shop one town over is known for the fact that no 
one working there really gets along. It, too, employs a number of specialists of the same 
quality as those at Dependable Autobody, but their process of fixing cars is haphazard: 
instead of going through a streamlined process, different mechanics check up on different 
parts of the car at different times, and constantly double-check the work as they generally 
do not trust that the other has done their job properly. As a result, while cars going into 
Dysfunctional Autobody do tend to go out fixed, the repairs typically take much longer. 
Here’s what I think we should say about these cases: Dependable Autobody possesses some 
relevant understanding with regards to fixing cars – we might say that they understand-how to 
fix cars, or understand-why such-and-such solution is suitable in a given situation – and that 
Dysfunctional Autobody lacks much of the understanding that their local competition possesses. 
This is not because cars do not come out of Dysfunctional Autobody repaired – the difference 
between the two shops is not, then, due to an failure of a relevant getting it right condition – but 
rather that in the former the relationships between the members is one that is able to produce a 
relevant grasping at the group level, whereas this is not the case in the latter. 
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To see why this is the case, consider again how the members of each group relate to one 
another. Each member of Dependable Autobody is reliant on the other in figuring something out 
–  for example, why it is the case that a particular car refuses to start – and each member acts 
under the assumption that their coworkers possess the skills and knowledge required to properly 
work on their respective parts of the car. It may very well be the case that there is minimal or no 
overlap in relevant skills and knowledge between members – for example, the engine specialist 
might know little about the finer points of how brakes work, and the brakes specialist might not 
know anything about alignment. But that they are aware of each other’s knowledge and abilities, 
and take it for granted in doing their work towards the goal of fixing the car, demonstrates the 
extent to which each member is reliant on each other in working towards a shared goal. This is 
not the case for Dysfunctional Autobody: since each member of this group works in isolation and 
generally distrusts that the other members know what they are doing, members of the group are 
not in the relevant sense reliant on each other.  
As a result, the Dysfunctional Autobody group will again fail to exhibit some of the 
characteristic indications of possessing understanding. Say, for example, that a car is producing 
an odd noise as a result of a combination of problems with the brakes and alignment23, and that if 
it were to be sent to either autobody shop it would come out in such a condition that it no longer 
produced that noise. Due to the way in which members of Dependable Autobody rely on each 
other and are aware of each other’s duties and abilities, it seems that the group could understand 
the cause of the noise: the group could provide an explanation of why the noise was occurring 
(e.g. as the communication between members would allow them to discover the source of the 
problem), could draw relevant conclusions from that information (e.g. that similar problems 
 
23 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this example. 
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could occur in the future due to the interaction with other key components), and could act as a 
good source of information (e.g. could inform the owner exactly what was wrong with the car). 
Since the members of Dysfunctional Autobody do not have the same kinds of relationships with 
one another, however, it seems that this group would not be able to possess the same 
understanding, given that it would be unable to provide consistent explanations (since there is 
minimal communication between members it is unlikely that they could recognize a problem 
existing at the intersection of two different areas of the car), draw relevant conclusions (as a lack 
of communication between members will preclude the possibility of such reasoning), or act as a 
good source of information (as the group would not be able to tell the owner why the noise was 
occurring). The key difference between the two cases, then, is that while members of 
Dependable Autobody are mutually p-reliant, members of Dysfunctional Autobody are not. 
Note that an important component of mutual p-reliance is that it involves relationships of 
reliance that are, in fact, mutual. This is required as to rule out cases in which there are reliance 
relationships within a group that all go one way, such that one or a small number of members are 
doing all the heavy lifting. Consider again the river rescue case, but change it so that the friend 
who initially throws the rope is a bodybuilder, and thus perfectly capable of rescuing his friend 
himself. His other friends might then grab onto the rope as well, perhaps in an attempt to look 
like they are helping, while in reality not contributing anything. Thus, while the friends rely on 
the work of the bodybuilder, this reliance is not mutual, in that the bodybuilder does not require 
anyone else’s help, and indeed is doing all of the work himself. In this case, then, we would not 
say that the group has a grasp of the rope, but that the bodybuilder does, since there are no 
mutual dependence relationships between the individuals. As an epistemic analogue, we can 
consider a case in which several members of a class have been assigned to complete a group 
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project, but in which one student does all of the work, while the remaining group members fail to 
contribute anything. Here we would say that the student who did the work grasps and possesses 
the relevant understanding, but not that the group does. Again, this is because while there are 
reliance relationships in the group – all the lazy members of the group rely on the hard-working 
member – these relationships are not mutual. 
One might have the following objection to the interpretation of the two autobody cases 
that I have provided: instead of thinking that there is understanding possessed by a group, we 
should think that there is merely understanding produced by a group24. I take it that the idea that 
understanding comes about as the result of the work of a group is much less controversial than 
the idea that the group itself can possess that understanding. For example, in coming to 
understand the nature of some complex scientific fact I might consult a number of expert 
scientists who all provide me with information from their own areas of expertise: in such a case 
we might say that while the group of scientific experts were required for the production of 
understanding, it is ultimately I who possesses that understanding, not the group with members 
consisting of the experts I consulted. We might worry, then, that a case like Dependable 
Autobody merely illustrates that cases in which members of a group all contribute towards 
understanding do not necessarily demonstrate that the group possesses that understanding. 
There are a number of reasons why we should resist this interpretation. First, unlike the 
case in which I seek out the advice of different scientists to understand a complex scientific fact, 
there is no individual member in the Dependable Autobody team that possesses the relevant 
understanding of how to fix a car in its entirety. After all, if we think of the group merely as 
 
24 Thanks to Mikkel Gerken and an anonymous reviewer for raising this worry. 
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producing understanding then that understanding needs to be possessed by something, so if it is 
not possessed by any individual then the remaining option is that it is possessed by the group. 
Second, and relatedly, no individual member of the group is able to perform the kinds of actions 
that are characteristic of the possession of understanding how to fix a car in its entirety: while the 
brakes specialist can apply her skills to many different types of brakes in many different 
circumstances, say, she is unable to deal with problems that arise when it comes to steering, 
alignment, etc. That the group can deal with such potential problems again implies that the 
understanding is not merely produced by, but possessed by the group. Finally, as we saw above 
one of the motivations for attributing understanding to groups was that possessing understanding 
is characteristic of expertise, and we often treat groups as experts. In the case in which I acquire 
understanding as the result of group production of understanding, it is plausible that I should be 
treated as an expert. However, in the case of Dependable Autobody, it does not seem to be the 
case that any individual member of the group should themselves be treated as an expert in how to 
fix a car in its entirety (we could, of course, still treat them as an expert in their area of 
specialization). That we would defer to the group and not any individual again indicates that 
understanding is not merely produced by the group, but possessed by it, as well. 
There is a separate worry one might have with the cases I have presented thus far, namely 
that they are idealized in the sense that they involve a group comprised of members that are not 
only all working towards a shared goal of which they are all aware, but are also fully aware of 
the skills and knowledge of every other member. Clearly, though, not all groups to which we 
want to attribute understanding function this way. Consider, for example, a very large lab that is 
working towards the goal of understanding how a virus replicates in order to try to cure a certain 
disease. It may very well be the case that there will be members of the group working on the 
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same problem that do not rely on every other member in the ways described above, perhaps 
because they work only with those within their local team. In such a case, then, there would not 
be mutual p-reliance in the sense that all members of the group directly rely on every other 
member, although we would still want to say that the lab as a whole possesses the relevant 
understanding. 
What this example illustrates is that within large complex groups can exist smaller 
subgroups which themselves exist in reliance relationships with other subgroups and members. 
We should, then, make an adjustment to the concept of mutual p-reliance. Say that members of a 
group are mutually p-reliant either if they are directly reliant on each other, or if they are a 
member of a mutually-reliant subgroup that is itself mutually reliant on other subgroups within 
the main group. This latter variety of mutual p-reliance is that which is exemplified by the lab 
case: each member will still be reliant on, for example, members of their own smaller team, 
which will in turn be reliant on other members and teams, and which are all ultimately directed 
towards the goal of figuring out the same thing. That mutual p-reliance can be established by 
reliance relationships between members and subgroups within groups thus allows us to account 
for how a group like the large lab can be said to grasp and possess understanding in an 
inflationary sense. 
In developing an inflationary notion of group grasping we have, then, tackled the most 
significant problem in developing an overall inflationary notion of group understanding. While 
the goals of this paper have been to motivate and argue for the possibility of group 
understanding, I do not take myself to have solved all the potential problems that could come 
alone with such an investigation; regardless, I take there to be at least a good amount of 
motivation for investigating the nature of group understanding as not just metaphorical. 
34 
 
Furthermore, while I think that the debate between deflationary and inflationary accounts of 
group understanding has not been settled here, I have presented what I take to be at least a first 
step towards determining how a group can be related to its members in such a way that 
understanding can come about at the group level even if it is not possessed by any of its 
members. 
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